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The purpose of what follows is to examine how government policy 
should be shaped by the concept of equality. I will divide the discussion into 
two sections: the first examines what a proper concept of justice should be, 
while the second examines how a just government ought to concern itself 
with equality. The subject matter of these sections may overlap, but the 
distinction still may be useful. It will hopefully become clear to the readers 
that the scope of equality is much more complex and far reaching than they 
had previously thought.  
My application of equality to a just governmental policy will in many 
ways be idealized, but some presuppositions I make show that in other ways 
it is not. For example, in discussing a government’s foreign policy, I will not 
spend space considering whether there should be one globally unified state; 
this is not the way the modern world is, and I consequently prefer to be less 
idealized in my theory. Nevertheless, most of my examination will still 
remain idealized in other respects because this does not seem to preclude 
such considerations from being useful in the modern world but, I find, proves 
quite useful in shaping how one ought to view equality, justice, politics, and 
the like. 
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Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité: Defining Justice 
 
 The first section I will examine concerns what a proper theory of justice 
should look like. This is relevant to the main discussion of equality since the 
second section will consider what is the proper scope of equality from the 
perspective of just governments. The first section will also establish the views 
of equality I find most plausible. My position concerning justice will largely 
rely on John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. We can begin by looking at the 
principles of justice he lays out in it. 
 
 
1.1 Rawls’s Principles of Justice 
 
 I will start with discussing Rawls’s formulation of his principles of 
justice, for these will help to lay the structure of this section. His first principle 
of justice is, ‘Each person is to have an equal right of the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for 
all.’ The second is, ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open 
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.’1 Much can be said 
about these principles; he has suggested that they largely can be compared to 
the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and it is under these headings 
that the first section will be divided in order to gain a proper understanding 
of justice. 
                                               
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
266. For the remainder of the first section, page numbers for this work will be cited 
parenthetically. 




 Rawls suggests that the concept of liberty corresponds to his first 
principle, according to which people are guaranteed the most extensive 
system of rights compatible with a similar system for others. But the question 
arises as to how these rights or any of the principles to which the people 
adhere come about. To decide what these principles and rights will be, he 
adopts a contractarian theory of justice, following in similar suit to Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant. Examining his concepts of the original position and the 
veil of ignorance will help highlight the contours of his position. The liberties 
of individuals may not be explicitly mentioned, but the discussion which 
follows will at least explain how they should be determined. 
 
 
1.2.1 The Original Position 
 
In seeking a conception of social justice, Rawls seeks to provide ‘a 
standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are 
to be assessed’ (8). On his contractarian account, the principles of justice are 
determined in an original agreement—what he calls the original position. They 
are the principles which ‘free and rational persons concerned to further their 
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the 
fundamental terms of their association. These principles are to regulate all 
further agreements’ (10). Thus he chooses to give his conception of justice the 
name ‘justice as fairness,’ which suggests that the principles of justice are 
agreed to in an initial position which is fair. Of course, the original position is 
not an actual historical event but rather a hypothetical situation used to 
understand what a proper conception of justice should be. 
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Rawls’s contractarian original position allows individuals to pursue 
their conception of the good to the greatest extent. Obviously a person cannot 
have absolutely everything he wants; Rawls points out that the existence of 
other people precludes this. He explains that in price theory equilibrium 
results from agreements struck between willing traders. ‘For each person it is 
the best situation that he can reach by free exchange consistent with the right 
and freedom of others to further their interest in the same way’ (103). 
Similarly, in the original position individuals deliberate about what principles 
of justice will regulate their future interactions, and equilibrium is reached 
when individuals have pursued their own conception of the good to the 
greatest extent that is harmonious with the rights of others who are doing 
likewise. Thus it seeks to allow individuals to have the greatest liberty that is 
compatible with the same liberty for others. 
Two conditions he places on the circumstances of the original position 
are that there is moderate scarcity and that people will have different ends 
and purposes. If there were not the condition of moderate scarcity, a scheme 
of cooperation would seem superfluous. Moreover, a theory devoid of this 
condition would not be particularly relevant to reality, where I assume there 
is not an unlimited supply of resources. In addition, the condition that 
different people have different purposes seems to be a warranted requirement 
which keeps this theory applicable since it is a fact that there is a plurality of 
beliefs, religions, purposes, etc. in the world. Rawls notices that, without these 
circumstances, ‘there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice, just as in 
the absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for 
physical courage’ (110). 
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1.2.2 The Veil of Ignorance 
 
Within the original position, parties are under what Rawls calls the veil 
of ignorance. I find this concept quite illuminating, and many of the remaining 
arguments will stem from it. Under the veil of ignorance, parties deliberating 
in the original position ‘do not know how the various alternatives will affect 
their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on 
the basis of general considerations.’ They do not know their class position, 
natural abilities, intelligence, psychological features (e.g., risk aversion), nor 
do they know what political or economic situation or time in which their 
society exists (118). The only particular facts of which they are aware are that 
they are the contemporary generation (254) and are subject to the principles of 
justice and whatever this implies (119). 
Thus under the veil of ignorance, no party knows what is in its interest. 
The principles of justice, then, presumably will be the most beneficial 
arrangement for all parties, since each party, not knowing any particulars 
pertaining to itself, will secure some arrangement that would be the most 
likely to be to its advantage. And since all would have an equal opportunity 
to pursue their concept of the good when establishing principles of justice, 





 The previous discussion of the original position and veil of ignorance 
has demonstrated how the liberties of individuals and the principles by which 
they are to abide should be formed. The concept of equality also plays a 
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central role in Rawls’s concept of justice. And it deserves especial attention 
since it is with this concept that I am primarily concerned. 
 
 
1.3.1 Equality of What? 
 
 While many will likely say that equality is an important consideration 
with regard to distributive justice, the question is soon posed: equality of 
what? This debate is quite extensive and multifaceted, but sufficient space 
cannot be given to it here. Rather, I will only be able to briefly canvass a few 
of the main arguments and then address the one I find most plausible.  
 One view advocates equality of resources, a view which Ronald 
Dworkin helps illustrate. Distributing an equal amount of resources to people 
allows them to do as they please with them (in Dworkin’s example, people on 
a deserted island are given an equal amount of clamshells with which to 
trade2). This is what many people have in mind when considering equal 
distributions: give people an equal amount, let them do with it as they wish, 
and that is just. But problems arise when one considers congenital talents, 
which the possessors have by no merit of their own. These talents may allow 
some to make more of the resources given to them; some people are born with 
more ambition than others, hence it may seem unjust that a distribution of 
resources does not take this into account. In addition, people may have to 
focus resources on handicaps or other types of bad luck, which they have by 
no fault of their own. 
 So perhaps equality of resources does not actually guarantee equality 
in the way many people wish. Another option is to be concerned with 
                                               
2 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,’ Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 10 (1981): 285ff. 
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equality of welfare in distributing resources. A distribution may then take 
into account factors that make equality of resources undesirable. It will result 
in an uneven distribution of resources, but this is for the sake of granting 
people an equal level of welfare with whatever resources they have been 
given. This view, however, also runs into problems when one considers 
expensive tastes. For example, some people may obtain a certain welfare level 
by drinking cheap beer and pizza, while others may have cultivated 
expensive tastes and desire fine wine and caviar to obtain the same level of 
welfare. To many it may not seem just for a distribution to dedicate a 
significantly greater amount of resources to those with expensive tastes than 
to others with cheaper tastes in order to give all an equal level of welfare. 
A different view suggests it is equality of opportunity that is 
important. Richard Arneson defines opportunity as ‘a chance to get a good if 
one seeks it.’3 Whether individuals have equal opportunity at a given time 
depends on whether they have an equality of options. People can lose such 
options through voluntary choice; this is still harmonious with equal 
opportunity. He states that he is more concerned with equal opportunity 
rather than straight equality because it is ‘morally fitting to hold individuals 
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their voluntary choices, and in 
particular for that portion of these consequences that involves their own 
achievement of welfare or gain or loss of resources.’4 Equality of opportunity 
for welfare, for example, would compensate for congenital expensive tastes 
while it does not follow that people who purposefully cultivate such tastes 
should be compensated for them. I find this view is the most reasonable; 
Rawls also advocates equality of opportunity, and it is to his view we can 
now turn. 
                                               
3 Richard Arneson, ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,’ Philosophical Studies 56 
(1989): 85. 
4 Ibid., 87. 
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1.3.2 Rawls on Equality of Opportunity 
 
Just as Arneson argues that one should be concerned with equality of 
opportunity, Rawls maintains that people should have equal opportunity to 
take part in and influence the affairs of society. Rawls acknowledges there are 
certain underserved inequalities which merit redress—for example, 
inequalities of birth and natural endowment (86). Doing this would seek to 
provide an equality of opportunity for a person ‘to enjoy the culture of his 
society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each 
individual a secure sense of his own worth.’ It might be the case that, say, 
those born with less intelligence should have more resources spent on them 
than on the more intelligent. But he writes that this natural distribution ‘is 
neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at 
some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and 
unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts’ (87). These natural 
inequalities are not unjust in themselves; a government which does not 
redress the inequality of opportunity which will result from them might be, 
however. 
To achieve equal opportunity, he maintains that positions in society 
must not just be open in the formal sense (e.g., not discriminating because of 
race, gender, etc.), but also those with similar talents and willingness should 
be able to have the same prospects for positions (63). For example, a poor 
person should have the opportunity to obtain the best education he or she 
can—just as much opportunity as someone who is rich, whose parents are, 
say, generous benefactors to an ivy-league school.  
The same equal opportunity should apply to the political realm. Hence 
it should not be the case that Gordon Brown is one of only a few prime 
ministers who did not attend an Oxbridge school. Nor should it be the case 
that over half of US senators are millionaires. Perhaps this change would 
Equality and Government Policy 11 
  
mean that political campaigns should be strictly publicly financed to level the 
playing field. In any case, such things would be different if all had an equal 
opportunity to obtain positions in and influence society. Claiming that people 
obtain these positions because of their superior education only returns one to 
the current unequal opportunity for such education. 
Another important matter is whether such equality of opportunity to 
affect societal affairs should extend to the elderly. Philippe Van Parijs 
suggests this is an important consideration, for the elderly, having little 
future, may advocate policies and distributions which may greatly be in their 
favor, but whose long-term effects they will not have to witness; they will 
likely use their right to forward their unavoidably short-term interests.5 
 Van Parijs also notes that as medicinal knowledge continues to grow 
and people live longer, the proportion of society living in retirement will 
continue to enlarge. As a result, more and more resources will be directed 
toward old-age pensions and medical care for the retired.6 This will seem to 
put an unfair and unequal burden on the younger generation, who will 
receive less (e.g., they will be taxed more) so that the growing retired 
population may have these benefits.  
 However, I will discuss (section 1.4) the idea that fraternity is an 
important component of societies, and that societal bonds are analogous to 
those of families. Some may argue that the elderly do not take part in the 
affairs of society and therefore should not have a say in them. However, the 
elderly often also do not take part in many family affairs yet are nevertheless 
accorded respect and authority over these affairs. This respect for elders is 
much more prominent in Eastern societies than it is in Western. I maintain 
equal opportunity to affect societal affairs should extend to the elderly; people 
                                               
5 Philippe Van Parijs, ‘The Disenfranchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure 
Intergenerational Justice’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998): 293. 
6 Ibid., 295. 
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should not feel that they are ostracized from influencing society as they grow 
older. On the other hand, a government may be required to step in; while the 
elderly should be given an equal opportunity, this should be limited as it may 
create an unequal and significant burden to be placed on the younger of the 
generation.  
Some may argue that this inequality is fine since it will even out on a 
view of their whole lives: the young may be burdened while young, but they 
will be benefited proportionally by the young when they are old. But this 
seem to foster irresponsibility. It is important to take responsibility for life 
choices—smoking for example, which may make one worse off when older; 
others should not be required to compensate for this. Moreover, it must also 
be noticed that many die before reaping the benefits retirement, so it would 
seem unfair to burden them while young, only for them to die before being 
compensated proportionally.  Thus it seems fair (and what people might 
agree to under a veil of ignorance) that equality of opportunity to influence 
societal affairs should extend to the elderly, while it should not create an 





Egalitarianism has been dichotomized into those who think equality is 
valuable as an end in itself and those who view it as a valuable means to a 
different end. The former are regarded as non-instrumental egalitarians while 
the latter are instrumental egalitarians. I find that the most compelling of these 
two is the second; by examining both views and their implications, the 
                                               
7 As to when this equal opportunity should start, I am uncertain. See Van Parijs, pp. 302-303 
for a brief discussion of minimum voting age. 
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reasons for this preference will hopefully become clear. In addition, it is 
important to examine these views because the view of John Rawls, upon 
whose arguments much of the remaining discussion will rely, defends a 
theory that is at least in part egalitarian.  
 
 
1.3.3.1 Rejection of Non-instrumental Egalitarianism 
 
According to a non-instrumental egalitarian, equality is valuable in 
itself. Hence a given distribution that is equal is better in a respect than a 
similar unequal distribution. For example, suppose there is a distribution for 
groups a and b, represented in the form (a, b), where numbers representing 
levels of well-being will be put in place of a and b. Thus for a non-
instrumental egalitarian a distribution of (3, 3) would presumably be 
preferable to (2, 4) and even more preferable than (1, 5). In each distribution 
there is a total well-being of 6 between the two groups. Assuming that this is 
the only significant difference between the distributions (and assuming the 
equality/inequality does not affect the groups), a non-instrumental egalitarian 
may overall prefer the distribution (3, 3) because it is better with respect to 
equality, and it maintains the same total level of well-being as the other two. 
Things become less clear when other distributions are compared. 
Consider the distributions (3, 3) and (20, 25). How would a non-instrumental 
egalitarian view these distributions? The first is equal, whereas there is 
inequality in the second. However, there is a significantly higher level of well-
being in the second distribution (a total level of 45) than in the first (a total 
level of 6). Would an non-instrumental egalitarian favor the first solely on 
account of its equality? Perhaps, but they likely would not prefer it to a 
distribution of, say (1000, 1050). Most would reasonably agree that the value 
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of the equality in a distribution of (3, 3) is outweighed by the great increase in 
levels of well-being. Rather, such egalitarians might instead claim that (3, 3) is 
not better overall but still better in a respect, namely with respect to equality.  
Such a view runs into difficulty when it meets what is called the 
Leveling Down Objection. Consider the following distribution (represented 





              
                              A             B       C 
 
A non-instrumental egalitarianism must admit that B is better than A in some 
respect—with respect to equality. However, it strikes many as unappealing 
that a move from A to B is better in any respect. After all, there is no one for 
whom B is better. Derek Parfit explains that the Leveling Down Objection 
recognizes that non-instrumental egalitarians claim such a move makes things 
better in a respect even though it is ‘worse for some people, and better for no 
one.’8 This objection gains even more force when egalitarians will, by the 
same token, have to assert that C is also better than A in a respect. This seems 
quite implausible since C has a drastically lower level of total well-being. 
Moreover, one may wonder: for whom is such a distribution better? 
 Nils Holtug raises the point that the Leveling Down Objection has 
much of its force because it expresses the commonly held belief that morality 
should have a person-affecting form.9 It seems odd that in a shift from one 
distribution to another none are affected for the better, some are affected for 
                                               
8 Ibid., 98. 
9 Nils Holtug, ‘Good for Whom?’ Theoria 69 (2003): 5. 
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the worse, and some still claim that the shift is better in a respect.10 Parfit 
writes, ‘It is not hard to see how an outcome can be worse for particular 
people. But it can seem puzzling how an outcome can be simply worse—
worse, period.’11 Indeed, I shall later posit arguments based on this belief that 
morality should be person affecting. 
However, Larry Temkin does offer what I find to be a strong counter-
argument to such observations; he notices that there are cases where people 
intuitively believe one of two alternatives is better even though it is not 
person affecting. He shows this in his example comparing the live for today 
and take care of tomorrow policies, a variation of some examples Parfit gives 
concerning what he calls the Non-Identity Problem.12 These policies examine 
two alternatives for parents considering to have a child. On the ‘live for today’ 
policy people immediately have children, thus depleting the natural resources 
available, while on the ‘take care of tomorrow’ policy they wait a few years to 
have children and instead conserve resources. Most people think the ‘take 
care of tomorrow’ policy is the better choice.13 However, this seems contrary 
what people supposedly believe; it is an example where people find an option 
better even though it is better for no one and worse for some. That is, Parfit 
points out that if parents have a child later (as would be the case on the ‘take 
care of tomorrow’ policy), it would be a different child than would have been 
                                               
10 However, I do not claim that the Leveling Down Objection is a knock-down objection to 
non-instrumental egalitarianism. I agree with Campbell Brown when he writes that ‘there is 
nothing absurd or obviously mistaken in the belief that levelling down may make things 
better in some respect’ (Campbell Brown, ‘Giving Up Levelling Down,’ Economics and 
Philosophy 19 (2003): 112). It may be a tenable claim, but it still strikes many as an unappealing 
position to hold. But I use the objection to emphasize my preference for person-affecting 
morality as well as a reason why I prefer instrumental egalitarianism and prioritarianism 
(Although  Brown also points out (pp. 124-129) that prioritarians are vulnerable to the same 
objection). 
11 Parfit, 114. 
12 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 359ff. 
13 Larry Temkin, ‘Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection,’ in The Ideal of 
Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams, pp. 121-161 (New York: Macmillan and 
St. Martin’s, 2000), 137. 
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born earlier, so the policy does not seem to be benefiting a particular person.14 
The children of the ‘live for today’ policy will never exist if the other policy is 
chosen, and it does not seem a situation can be worse for someone who will 
not exist. And choosing the ‘take care of tomorrow’ policy means the parents 
will be worse off since they will have to be disciplined and not spend 
resources. This situation of parents and children can be represented in a 
diagram:                                      
                                                     
                                   p    
                   p              
                  p   Cb  
           Ca 
 
                                     
                                       D                          E                              F 
 
It seems a policy of moving from D to F is worse for some (p) and better for 
none (since Ca would not exist). A policy of moving from D to E is better for 
some (p) and worse for none (since child Cb would not exist). People generally 
believe the former policy should be the one adopted, contrary to the idea that 
morality must be person affecting. Hence this appears to be a case of leveling 
down that many would agree is better in some respect. 
This argument, while it has spawned numerous arguments in reply, I 
find ultimately is quite persuasive. It appears to make it plausible for a non-
instrumental egalitarian to claim a situation can be better in a respect even 
though there is no one for whom it is better. Others, such as John Broome, 
also offer examples that morality need not necessarily be person affecting. He 
asks us to consider three distributions: A: (1, Ω), B: (Ω, 1), and C (Ω, 2), where 
Ω represents nonexistence. A and B appear equally good, and C appears 
better than B. But if morality were required to have a person-affecting form, 
                                               
14 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 362-363. 
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he argues, then we should have no preference between A and C, contrary to 
the view many hold that C is better than A in the same way it is better than B. 
But since the second person in C does not exist in A, this cannot be the case if 
morality must be person affecting.15 However, these examples seem to be too 
few and unusual to warrant acceptance over another theory if that theory 
proves to be more comprehensive.16 That is, both Temkin and Broome seem 
largely (albeit not entirely) to rely on examples which hinge on 
existence/nonexistence of a person—not what I find especially commonplace 
issues. Morality should, I believe, in almost all circumstances be person 
affecting. 
Moreover, it may still seem odd for people to understand what the 
point of asserting that such distributions are better. For example, Parfit 
considers a Divided World where the two halves of the world’s population are 
unaware of the other’s existence.17 If one half is better off than the other, this 
inequality is supposedly bad even though it does not have any negative 
effects. Non-instrumental egalitarians can maintain that such inequality is 
bad, but it is not especially clear what the point is of asserting this. Ultimately, 
I reject non-instrumental egalitarianism not because it is untenable, but rather 
because its defense does not appear to be very strong in comparison with 
other options which I find more attractive. 
 
 
                                               
15 John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 136. 
16 See Brian Weatherson, ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’ Philosophical Studies 115: 7ff. 
Weatherson discusses how a theory need not be definitive to warrant acceptance. Rather, it 
should be the most plausible account we have available. This idea is relevant to the discussion 
at hand because, as I have mentioned, I find some of the views I do not ultimately accept 
quite compelling, and I rather choose another because I find it to be the most plausible 
account. 
17 Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority,’ 87. 
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1.3.3.2 Acceptance of Instrumental Egalitarianism 
 
Instrumental egalitarians find themselves required to answer fewer 
objections than a non-instrumental egalitarian. They do not maintain a 
position that equality is valuable in itself, but rather that it is valuable as a 
means to some independent end. Such people as Roger Crisp and Harry 
Frankfurt posit accounts which help highlight the contours of this view. 
Both argue for positions that can be seen as valuing equality as a means 
to the end of everyone having sufficient resources. According to sufficientism, 
‘we ought to give priority to benefiting those who are not sufficiently well 
off.’18 Crisp suggests the ‘Compassion Principle’ and illustrates it with his 
Beverly Hills example.19 By examining a case involving the rich and super-
rich of Beverly Hills, it becomes clear that inequality in itself is not necessarily 
what matters. For example, in a distribution of resources, people may find it 
unimportant that someone with, say, ten million dollars receives a bit less 
than someone with, say, a hundred million dollars. Rather he suggests that 
equality matters when it concerns people for whom we would feel 
compassion because of their situation. Hence a distribution should be 
equalized if the inequality is harming someone for whom we would have 
compassion. 
Similarly, Frankfurt suggests that it is not inequality which matters but 
whether people have enough; this he calls the ‘doctrine of sufficiency.’20 For 
example, he notices that many people do not feel bad for the poor per se. 
People would not likely feel bad for a family of lower economic status if the 
family was content. Rather, pity would be reserved for those who were poor 
                                               
18 Campbell Brown, ‘Priority or Sufficiency...or Both?’ Economics and Philosophy 21 (2005): 199. 
19 Roger Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority, and Compassion,’ Ethics 113 (2003): 758ff. 
20 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal,’ Ethics 98 (1987): 21. 
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and did not have enough.21 He gives a particularly salient example which 
highlights this concept. He considers a population of ten people, each who 
need a well-being level of 5 to live. There is a total level of 40 units of well-
being to be distributed. Distributing it equally means that everyone would 
die, for each would then have a well-being of 4, one less than what is required 
to live. Surely few would favor such a distribution; as Frankfurt puts it, such a 
stance would be ‘morally grotesque.’22 But a non-instrumental egalitarian 
would be committed to saying this distribution is better in a respect 
(hopefully not all things together, though)—I find this quite unappealing. A 
more reasonable distribution would save as many as possible (i.e., eight), 
while two would die.  
This example shows that under such conditions of scarcity, equality is 
not particularly beneficial, but actually may be harmful since the equal 
distribution brings about the death of all the individuals. Yet he also 
concludes, ‘Even if equality is not as such morally important, a commitment 
to an egalitarian social policy may be indispensable to promoting the 
enjoyment of significant goods besides equality or to avoiding their 
impairment. Moreover it might turn out turn out that the most feasible 
approach to the achievement of sufficiency would be the pursuit of equality.’23 
Such views exemplify the instrumental egalitarian position; it may be the case 
that equality is valuable in achieving a particular end, but there are also cases 
where it may not be valuable and may even be detrimental to achieving 
certain ends.  
 
 
                                               
21 Ibid., 33. 
22 Ibid., 30. 
23 Ibid., 22. 




 Lastly we can look at how a proper concept of justice relates to the idea 
of fraternity. In Rawls’s conception of justice, he posits what is called the 
difference principle, which states that, unless there is a distribution that makes 
all better off, an equal distribution is to be preferred (65-66). A family 
exemplifies why the difference principle can be likened to the concept of 
fraternity: families do not want ‘to have greater advantages unless this is to 
the benefit of others who are less well off...Members of a family commonly do 
not wish to gain unless they can do so in ways that further the interests of the 
rest’ (90). According to the difference principle, an unequal distribution is not 
preferred unless such inequality benefits everyone. More specifically, especial 
concern should be given to the effects on the worse off if inequality is to be 





 As we see in Rawls’s difference principle, prioritarianism gives priority 
to the worse off. Temkin suggests why prioritarianism presents itself as such 
an attractive alternative to egalitarianism: ‘People are drawn to 
prioritarianism not necessarily as a position expressing what the egalitarian 
does care about, but rather as a position expressing what one should care 
about.’ Thus, not unlike Crisp or Frankfurt, some may not be attracted to 
ideals detached from actually affecting people but rather concern themselves 
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with issues it seems one should care about more. Indeed, Temkin notes that 
prioritarianism is fairly plausible as an instrumental egalitarian position.24 
In defining prioritarianism, there is a view from which it should be 
distinguished.  Take the graph below: 
 





                                                                                               x 
                                                                   a    b                        c   d       
    
Let y represent the level of well-being, and let x represent a certain resource to 
be distributed. The increase in resources between a and b is the same as that 
between c and d. However, the corresponding growth in well-being is much 
greater for a shift from a to b than it is from c to d. Campbell Brown writes that 
utilitarians ’have often exploited this so-called “law of diminishing marginal 
utility” in order to argue, on utilitarian grounds, for policies of equality in 
resource distribution.’25 Utilitarians would prefer such a view because the 
worse off would be the easiest to help with the fewest resources.  
The view I shall defend, however, is different: the worse off should be 
helped even if they are harder to help. Parfit defines the Priority View as simply 
that ‘benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are.’26 
                                               
24 Temkin, 130. Overall, I prefer a stance between prioritarianism and instrumental 
egalitarianism. Concerning prioritarianism, I specifically prefer the view which hybridizes 
prioritarianism and sufficientism. For such a view see Brown, ‘Priority or Sufficiency...or 
Both?’ especially 216-220.  
25 Brown, ‘Priority or Sufficiency...or Both?’ 199. 
26 Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority,’ 101. 
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Utilitarians may not necessarily agree with this position when it requires a 
sacrifice of efficiency in order to benefit the worse off.27 
What then is the difference between egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism? Egalitarians would agree that preference should be given to 
the worse off, but they would do so because this would reduce inequality; 
prioritarians do so for independent reasons. Parfit explains that egalitarians 
are concerned with relativities while prioritarians are concerned with absolutes 
regarding the condition of the worse off. That is, an egalitarian is concerned 
that the worse off are worse relative to others, thus giving priority to 
benefiting them makes them less worse off in relation to others (and makes 
the distribution more equal). Prioritarians, on the other hand, are concerned 
that the worse off are worse than they could have been; the level of others is 
irrelevant to this. He gives an analogy: ‘People at higher altitudes find it 
harder to breathe. Is this because they are higher up than other people? In one 
sense, yes. But they would find it just as hard to breathe even if there were no 
other people who were lower down. In the same way, on the Priority View, 
benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only because these people are 
at a lower absolute level.’28 
It should be noted that Rawls’s view on equal opportunity is tempered 
by his concomitant prioritarian stance. That is, he maintains that there are 
times when inequality of opportunity is justified, namely if such inequality 
enhances the opportunity of those with less opportunity. In fact, he makes the 
stronger claim that inequality of opportunity is permitted only if ‘the attempt 
to eliminate these inequalities would so interfere with the social system and 
the operations of the economy that in the long run anyway the opportunities 
                                               
27 And as Rawls writes, a just distribution is not always the most efficient. See Rawls, 59-65. 
28 Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority?’ 104. 
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of the disadvantaged would be even more limited’ (265). It appears he only 
finds such inequality justified if it benefits the worse off.29 
It should also be noted that prioritarians should be wary of labeling 
people as ‘worse off.’ For example, in the discussion concerning the elderly 
(see pp. 11-12), some may dub the elderly as the worse off, thus justifying 
significantly unequal distributions between them and younger generations 
since the worse off are being benefited. But I think that labeling the elderly as 
such is a bit paternalistic and condescending. Indeed, Elizabeth Anderson 
critiques along the same line a number of egalitarians, maintaining that they 
have missed the point of theories regarding equality, which should be to 
create a community where people ‘stand in relations of equality to others.’30 
 
 
1.4.2 Equality Between Groups 
 
 It is worth noting the importance of fraternity particularly when 
prioritizing government policies. The fraternity one has to one’s family is 
similar  to that which citizens would have for their country. Thus in the next 
section on domestic and foreign policy, domestic issues will often naturally 
take some precedence over foreign ones because of this fraternity. Michael 
Walzer notices that ‘if we did not provide for one another, if we recognized 
no distinction between members and strangers, we would have no reason to 
form and maintain political communities.’31 If we were not to show 
distinction, nations would not exist since people would have little reason to 
                                               
29 While I will maintain that the worse off should be given priority, I do not think they should 
have such absolute priority. Rawls’s views are not entirely clear on this issue. For a more in-
depth examination, see Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority?’ 116-121. 
30 Elizabeth Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics 109: 289. 
31 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983), 64. 
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form them. Rousseau asks about people and their country, ‘how can they love 
it, if their country be nothing more to them than to strangers, and afford them 
nothing but what it can refuse nobody?’32 Rather, countries are similar to 
families—‘that great family, the State,’33 as Rousseau terms it, possesses a 
certain fraternity amongst its members which is not similarly shared with 
those outside the state. 
But what if achieving equal opportunity for individuals in the US 
creates greater unequal opportunity in, say, India? Amartya Sen suggests that 
there will be what he calls ‘basal equality’—equality of the central concept—
which individuals should give primacy in establishing. He writes, ‘the 
endorsement of the importance of equality in that central space (i.e., basal 
equality) then yields the need to accept inequality in other spaces, since these 
different equalities could not be simultaneously guaranteed.’34 These other 
inequalities might be in entirely irrelevant areas or in areas which are simply 
less central, although still relevant. 
In the case of government policy, a nation’s government should be 
concerned primarily with that nation, for, as discussed, people have a special 
tie of fraternity to their country. So when considering global inequality, there 
is a limit to the actions a government should take. For example, suppose there 
is a nation that is fairly well off and numerous other nations with large 
populations which are considerably worse off. It seems reasonable that a 
government should not give away resources in efforts to equalize completely; 
this may result in worldwide equality in this sense, but it would make the 
government’s nation at hand significantly worse off. And it is not very likely, 
at least in a democratic nation, that people would agree for their government 
                                               
32 Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘A Discourse on Political Economy,’ in Great Books of the Western 
World, Vol. 38: Montesquieu; Rousseau, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins and trans. G.D.H. Cole 
(Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1959), 374. 
33 Ibid., 367. 
34 Amartya Sen, ‘On the Status of Equality,’ Political Theory 24 (1996): 395. 
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to make them significantly worse off. Perhaps in a society of completely 
altruistic people this would be possible, but not in reality. Thus a nation 
should not be concerned with equality to this extent in foreign policy. Perhaps 
the reasonable suggestion is that a nation should concern itself with 
equalizing in relation to foreign nations only as long as such measures do not 
threaten the existence of the nation qua the nation itself. As mentioned, a 
certain priority must be given to domestic affairs which takes into account the 
fraternity possessed by members of a country in order to preserve that 
country’s cohesion. 
On the other hand, creating equality within the government’s nation 
must bear in mind certain factors in other nations, as will be discussed (e.g., 
human rights). For example, achieving equal opportunity in one country 
would not be justified if it required enslaving another country. But as a 
country is primarily concerned with itself, it does not seem unwarranted in 
achieving equality within itself to produce some inequality in another. And a 
prioritarian would probably advocate this if the inequality were to benefit of 
the worse off nation.  
So when considering equality between groups (specifically, between 
nations), it is important to give precedence to the government’s nation. Not 
doing so may threaten the nation’s existence by ignoring its cohesive 
fraternity. At the same time, equalizing within one’s country should not result 
in inequality in other countries unless it is to the benefit of those countries or 
the inequality is not serious. Bearing this in mind, we can now look further 
into the discussion of equality and government policy. 
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Just Governments and Equality 
 
 The previous discussion has sought to establish what a proper concept 
of justice should be. Moreover, it has also highlighted some of the definitions 
and concepts central to a discussion of equality; the conclusions reached in 
this discussion apply to what follows. For example, I believe governments 
should not be non-instrumental egalitarian for the same reasons as discussed, 
but should rather be instrumental egalitarians/prioritarians. This section is 
intended to focus on how a just government’s domestic and foreign policies 
should be shaped by equality.  
 
 
2.1 General and Domestic Policy 
 
 We can begin by discussing a government’s general and domestic 
policies. These issues may extend past domestic policy, yet I have included 
them here because, as discussed, a government’s foremost concern should be 
with domestic affairs. While the application of, for example, time preference 
may overarch all policy-making, its application should primarily be examined 
with regard to domestic policy and secondarily to foreign policy. 
 
 
2.1.1 Equality and Time 
 
I will maintain that a government should not show time preference; 
rather, inequality extends through different periods of time. That is, a 
government should not only be concerned with the present generation when 
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forming policy. I will specifically advocate that a government should also give 
weight to future generations when forming policy in addition to the present 
generations. I first must dismiss the notion that governments should be 
concerned with equality in relation to past generations. I do this for a few 





First, I accepted the idea that morality should be person affecting.  
Temkin and Broome do offer a few examples which suggest otherwise, but 
these seem to be too few and unusual to warrant acceptance. Rather, in the 
vast majority of cases, I find it intuitive that morality is person affecting. If this 
is true, it is hard to see why a concern for equality and time should also factor 
in past generations. Shaping government policy in accordance with 
considerations of the present and the future seem to be more plausible, for 
such generations would actually have the possibility of being affected by such 
changes. Making changes in policy for past generations, however, could not 
affect those generations since they are in the past. It would be a case of 
leveling down, where some would be made worse and none are better off 
from the change. 
Secondly, I also concluded that non-instrumental egalitarianism is not 
the preferable choice. Rather, I think a prioritarian/instrumental egalitarian 
stance as Rawls posits is more reasonable. If one were to accept non-
instrumental egalitarianism, however, it would not be unreasonable to let 
government policy be shaped by considerations of past generations. For 
example, suppose a present generation is better off than a past generation; a 
non-instrumental egalitarian would be committed to agreeing that this 
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inequality is bad. But I find it unclear what it means to say this is ‘bad.’ Does 
saying that it is bad mean that it should be rectified?  
Suppose we take all factors into consideration—that the only difference 
between a past and present distribution is that they are unequal; how would a 
non-instrumental egalitarian respond? If the present distribution is better than 
the past, would the egalitarian actually prefer a to make the present 
generation worse off (himself included) simply because the past was worse 
off, and that inequality is bad? I find that this is highly unlikely, not just 
because I established prior to this that I do not adhere to non-instrumental 
egalitarianism, but I also think that few if any adherents would actually 
believe a present generation should purposefully make itself worse for this 
purpose.  
Granted, perhaps a non-instrumental egalitarian could compensate for 
such undesirable consequences, but I think it would only result in other 
undesirable consequences when considering the effects of progress. 
Presumably the concept of ‘progress’ means that we seek to make things 
better (i.e., better than they previously were). For example, around 0 AD, the 
global distribution was remarkably equal: almost everyone was poor. The 
average per capita income of the world currently is approximately $8,000 a 
year, whereas in 0 AD it was about $515 in today’s prices, a level which the 
World Bank considers to be extreme poverty. Or consider that in the US (a 
Western country I assume has made what people consider to be ‘progress’), 
the income per capita has grown thirty times in size (to about $38,000) in the 
last 200 years, while that of Ethiopia remains about the same as it was 200 
years ago at about $700 a year.35 I find the results of such progress good. But 
non-instrumental egalitarians could simply decide progress is bad, since it 
inevitably leads to inequality in time. Or perhaps they would say both 
                                               
35 Partha Dasgupta, Economics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 16-17. 
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progress and equality are valuable, yet progress is generally better ‘all things 
considered.’ But since progress almost inevitably implies time-inequality, this 
seems odd. How could someone hold two things as valuable which seem so 
antithetical to one another? It may be possible, but I find such a view 
unappealing. Hence I reject the notion that a government should be concerned 
with equality in relation to past generations. 
I am aware, however, of the serious objection that someone can be 
harmed when dead (ergo we should give weight to past generations). But 
since they no longer exist (in the normal sense of the word), I am not sure how 
the dead could be harmed or benefited. Michael Ridge suggests that ‘ordinary 
thought allows that slander can posthumously harm someone.’36 But I think 
this is wrong; ordinary thought may suggest that slander could harm 
someone’s reputation, legacy, or descendents, but this is very different from 
harming that person. I think harm/benefit ultimately should be person 
affecting and experiential; if I lose all my money in the stock market but am 
on vacation at the time and die without knowing this, I am not harmed.  
In the original position, I assume most would agree that a government 
should fulfill peoples’ posthumous wishes—for example, distributing their 
will. And I think the government should do so. If it does not, however, its 
fault will not be that it has harmed the dead, but rather that the present 
generation will see that it reneges on its promises. In a system of justice, it is 
not unusual to exclude the dead from consideration. For example, in the 
current Khmer Rouge trials in Cambodia, people such as Pol Pot and his most 
ruthless henchman, Ta Mok, will not be tried because they are dead, even 
though most guilt lies with them. One of the main purposes of these trials is 
for the sake of the survivors and their descendents. Similarly, a just 
distribution would consider the dead only if it was pertinent to the 
                                               
36 Michael Ridge, ‘Giving the Dead Their Due,’ Ethics 114: 8. 
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descendents or to the government keeping its word. While the objection 






Of course, a government should give particular notice to the present 
generation, but this is because a large amount of decisions concerning policy 
has little, no, or an unknown affect on future generations. And I have 
concluded that a government should not concern itself with past generations. 
However, there is an interesting connection between the present and past 
which should be noted. Dennis McKerlie presents two different views 
concerning time and equality—the ‘simultaneous segments’ and ‘complete 
lives’ views. Consider this representation of the lives of A and B at T1, T2, and 
T3: 
 
T1 T2 T3 
A 3 4 2 
B 1 4 4 
 
The complete lives view would prefer to keep the distribution where A has 2 
and B has 4 at T3; this is preferred because it allows A and B to have equality 
in their total levels of well-being (both would have a total of 9). The 
simultaneous segments view, however, would prefer that each point in time 
be equal, hence it would be better at T3 for both to have 3. The simultaneous 
segments view would not compensate for past inequality, while the complete 
lives view would.37 The most reasonable path seems to lie between the two.  
                                               
37 Dennis McKerlie, ‘Equality and Time,’ Ethics 99 (1989): 481. 
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But the important point to realize from this is that, as Sen notes, 
considerations of equality should not only be interpersonal but also 
intrapersonal.38  
 Sen writes that most economic judgments are based on a ‘snapshot 
picture’ of the economy at a certain point in time.39 This to me seems too rash. 
A person could be generally quite well off and happen to be in dire straits 
when the snapshot is taken, while another could have an anomaly of good 
fortune at that time which was not characteristic of that person’s life as a 
whole. At the same time, it does not seem feasible to construct a policy that 
would equalize for complete lives. It would be nearly impossible to project 
how the future may change an individual’s well-being; an equalization for 
two individuals’ complete lives up to a given point may be regretted at a later 
point in time. For example, suppose T4 were added onto the previous 
distribution, where A had 3 and B had 5 at this point. Originally, the complete 
lives view would have preferred A and B to have 2 and 4, respectively, at T3, 
but given the later point in time, T4, the view would prefer both to have 3 at 
T3. Since it is not possible to look into the future to know what people’s 
complete lives are, such a view cannot be too plausible in practice. Rather, a 
view that is similar to the simultaneous segments view, yet keeps a reasonable 
scope of the past in mind—for example, one which recognizes whether the 
snapshot picture of people’s lives up to that point is representative or 
somewhat anomalous—is the view I find the most reasonable to adopt. 
 It is important to recognize that this is still not concerned with past 
generations. The primary reason that past generations need not be a 
consideration in matters of equality is because no person is affected for the 
better or worse if changes were made. However, what I have just discussed 
involves present generations, yet takes into account their past in making 
                                               
38 Amartya Sen, ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism,’ The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 470. 
39 Ibid., 471. 
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present policy. Indeed, McKerlie writes, ‘Why should we believe that 
inequalities that do not make people’s lives worse are morally 
objectionable?’40 In what has been discussed, there will be a person who is 





While past generations are not a concern, this cannot also be said for 
future generations, for they possess the possibility of being affected by 
present policies. As Rawls writes, ‘It is a natural fact that generations are 
spread out in time and actual economic benefits flow only in one direction. 
This situation is unalterable.’41 So the question becomes: should policy only be 
dictated by present concerns, or is it important to give weight to the future as 
well? I will maintain that the scope of equality should extend to future 
generations which do not yet exist. 
The veil of ignorance sheds light on why this makes sense. Remember 
that under the veil of ignorance, parties do not know the particulars of their 
situation. They do not even know which time period is the present for them. 
A rational person behind the veil of ignorance would want to be concerned 
with equality between times. Consider what Rawls writes on savings between 
generations: 
 
The principle adopted must be such that they wish all earlier 
generations to have followed it…the parties are to ask themselves how 
much they would be willing to save at each stage of advance on the 
                                               
40 McKerlie, 485. 
41 Rawls, 254. 
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assumption that all generations have saved, or will save, in accordance 
with the same criterion…they will want all generations to provide 
some savings (excluding special circumstances), since it is to our 
advantage if our predecessors have done their share. These 
observations establish wide limits for the savings rule. To narrow the 
range somewhat further, we suppose the parties to ask what is 
reasonable for members of adjacent generations to expect of one 
another at each level of advance.42 
 
In other words, it is essentially the Golden Rule, the biblical adage to ‘do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.’ Hording all resources and 
saving none for others in a future generation would be in violation of this 
maxim. In addition, so would a policy where the present generation saved to 
an extent that it ended up being poorly off and the future was much better off 
than it.  
Rather, the veil of ignorance suggests something which rests between 
these two extremes. Since parties do not know in which time they exist, they 
would want to agree on a policy that would be the most to their benefit, 
regardless of their location in time. For all they know, they may find 
themselves in a poor society; this would keep them from suggesting an 
excessive interest rate when deliberating behind the veil of ignorance. But 
they would probably wish that the generation previous to theirs would have 
at least some savings for the future, so it seems just for them to do the same 
for the next generation. The level at which this savings rate should be is not 
necessarily clear (see Appendix A), but Rawls notes that the savings is not for 
the purpose of making the future rich but should be enough to bring about 
the realization of just institutions (see section 2.2.3) for the future.43 
                                               
42 Ibid., 255. 
43 Ibid., 257. 
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In this sense, then, it is important to be concerned with equality 
between present and future generations; if a high level of well-being in the 
present causes low well-being in the future generation, that inequality should 
be rectified. Rejecting non-instrumental egalitarianism, I do not find such 
inequality inherently bad, but I do find it bad if a generation indulges itself at 
the expense of the future generation, resulting in time-inequality. Hence, 
governments should be concerned with saving for the future generation to the 
same extent they would expect the previous generation to provide for them. 
Indeed, it seems irrational for an individual to show time preference (e.g., 
indulging in the present resulting in undesirable circumstances later in life); 
for a society, it seems unjust to show time preference. Rawls writes this is so 
because ‘the living take advantage of their position in time to favor their own 
interests.’44  
At the same time, however, there should be some limit to the extent 
equality is important between the present and future. A present generation 
should not make itself worse off if doing so will be a significant benefit to a 
very distant future generation. To some this may seem odd; Broome notes 
that it is contrary to the beliefs of many philosophers. ‘How,’ they ask, ‘can 
the mere date at which a good occurs make any difference to its value?’45 The 
answer I think is found in the original position. People are more concerned 
with proximate generations, and as discussed (section 1.2.2), under the veil of 
ignorance they will mainly want to secure that the generation prior to them 
had some savings. Distant generations are of much less concern. 
But how does progress factor in? Again, since I am not a non-
instrumental egalitarian, I do not think inequality is intrinsically bad. Rather, 
equality is often desirable because of the effects it has. Presumably, a future 
generation will have progressed to some extent, and it will be able to build on 
                                               
44 Ibid., 260. 
45 John Broome, ‘Discounting the Future,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994): 128. 
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what the previous generation had. If such progress were factored in, perhaps 
this would mean a present government would find a decrease in the savings 
rate justified. However, I do not think it needs to be a factor. Primarily, this is 
because the results of such progress is unknown. Perhaps it could lead to a 
cure to cancer, or perhaps it could lead to the development of a new bomb or 
nuclear war. I do not know if there is a way that a present society could gauge 
what such results will be. If this is not taken into account, then it may be the 
case (it will likely be the case if the past is any indication) that the future will 
be better off than the present. But even though this may be true, (1) there will 
probably not be a significant dichotomy between proximate generations but 
only on a broader scale, and (2) such an inequality, assuming that it is a result 
of progress, would affect no one for the worse and would affect many for the 
better (since I am assuming that inequality is a result of progress, I am 
ignoring the savings rate, which may be considered to make things worse for 
the present generation). 
I should remark about my person-affecting arguments for rejecting 
past generations as a concern and accepting future ones—I do not mean that 
specific people must be affected. This returns us to Parfit’s Non-Identity 
Problem. Adopting a policy of conservation might change things such that 
people will be born at different times, thus the identities of future people 
would be different. So adopting the policy may make different people, 
consequently none would be affected by the policy. But Parfit writes that we 
should adopt the following principle: ‘If in either of two possible outcomes 
the same number of people would ever live, it will be worse if those who live 
are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have 
lived.’46 Making the present generation a bit worse off by adopting a policy of 
conservation in order to equalize with the future would make the group of 
                                               
46 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 360. 
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future people better off than it would have been (although it may not affect 
any person particularly). But becoming worse off to equalize with the past 
makes no individual or group better. 
Again, a government should treat the present and future generations 
with some measure of equality—for example, by advocating conservation or 
population control; it is the ‘trustee for unborn generations.’47 The absence of 
the future generations from the decision-making concerning policy which 
affects them should not weigh against them.  
 
 
2.1.2 Nozick’s ‘Entitlement Theory’ 
 
Robert Nozick offers some ideas that should be taken into 
consideration. Some of his main arguments will not be discussed here as they 
are outside the scope of what I am examining. Namely, Nozick advocates a 
minimal state, and I will not address this argument. Most of my discussion 
concerns how governments should let equality play a role in the distribution 
of resources; therefore I am making a large presupposition which he 
ultimately rejects. Indeed, he notices that the term ‘distributive justice’ is not a 
neutral one but rather causes most people to presume there is some 
mechanism (viz. a government) which gives out a supply of resources.48 
Nevertheless, he does raise some points which can be addressed here. 
One point I find helpful is his idea that one cannot determine whether 
a situation is just or unjust simply by looking at it. Rather, it depends on how 
the distribution came about.49 On his ‘entitlement theory’ of distributive 
justice, 
                                               
47 Broome, ‘Discounting the Future,’ 153. 
48 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 149. 
49 Ibid., 232. 
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1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of 
justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.  
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of 
justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled 
to the holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 
and 2.50  
 
Thus in order to determine whether a given distribution is just, one must look 
to the past. If a distribution is in accord with these requirements, then that 
distribution is just according to Nozick. John Roemer notes that Nozick later  
adds the proviso that previous unjust acts can be undone through retribution, 
thus a just act need not have as antecedents past acts every one of which is 
just.51  
Nozick’s example of Wilt Chamberlin also proves useful—Chamberlin 
signs a contract which entitles him to twenty-five cents for each ticket bought 
to games in which he plays. People can, by their own free choice, decide 
whether they want to pay and attend or not. As it turns out, a large number of 
people choose to attend; as a result Chamberlin makes quite a large amount of 
money, much more than the average person makes. Such events would lead 
there to be significant inequality.52 Would such a distribution be just? For 
Dworkin notes that the economic market is at odds with equality.53 But I, in 
agreement with Nozick, find such a distribution just. It is the result of people 
exercising their free will, choosing to spend their resources as they please. It 
                                               
50 Ibid., 151. 
51 John Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996), 205. 
52 Nozick, 161-163. 
53 Dworkin, 289. 
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may result in inequality, but I see little reason why a government should 
concern itself or be required to do anything about such inequality. Otherwise, 
the government would continuously have to interfere to rebalance the 
distribution of resources that results from people’s free exchange; I find this 
unappealing. Hence I do not think a government should be concerned with 





Nozick’s entitlement theory raises the question of desert; for example, 
while it may make sense that free exchange may result in an unequal but just 
distribution, what about a distribution which begins as unequal? One 
generation may be unequal because of their free exchange, but what of their 
descendents? The children of someone who was well off may be better off 
than others through no merit of their own; they did not engage in free 
exchange which brought them to be better off. But it seems unjust for a 
government to equalize such inequality if some in the former generation 
purposefully chose to save for their descendents. Equalizing such inequality 
would disallow people from saving for their children (or at least void such 
                                               
54 But what about something like progressive taxation? It could be one way a prioritarian 
government would favor the worse off and ensure all have equal opportunity. It appears, 
though, that this could be in violation of what I have agreed to concerning Nozick’s 
entitlement theory. If the rich are entitled to their riches, it does not seem that a progressive 
tax should unequally infringe upon that to which they are entitled. However, I think that a 
commitment to equality of opportunity should be lexically prior to this. A progressive tax 
could admit that people are entitled to their riches, but that they will be treated unequally for 
the sake of favoring the worse off who do not possess the same equal opportunity. If this 
equality were achieved, I would assume that the progressive tax would cease. As Rawls 
writes, ‘Free market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal 
institutions which regulates the overall trends of economic events and preserves the social 
conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls, 63). 
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actions of their purpose), and not equalizing means that some will be in 
positions they have done nothing to deserve. 
To answer these questions, one can return to the discussion regarding 
equality of opportunity. If it is established that all should have an equal 
opportunity to taking part in the affairs of a society, this is harmonious with a 
past generation saving for its descendents. There may be inequality in the 
present generation, but unless it impedes such equal opportunity, a 
government need not concern itself with it. If it is an impediment, then I do 
think a government should take measures to rectify it. This need not mean the 
government would have to take away what past people have reserved for 
their descendents, but it could mean a government would dedicate more 
resources for, say, education to those who are less well off, in order to allow 
them such equal opportunity.  
There are other concerns with regard to desert that do not strictly 
pertain to Nozick’s entitlement theory. Take the examples of Hurricane 
Katrina or the tsunami which hit southeast Asia in 2004. In addition to leaving 
large numbers of people dead, these events also left countless people 
homeless. Before these events occurred, however, there were still large 
numbers of homeless people. Do governments have a duty to the victims of 
such events any more than they do to other homeless? If the other homeless 
people, as a result of their life choices, have come to deserve their position of 
homelessness, then a government would obviously dedicate resources to 
helping those who deserved their home-owning position yet lost it due to an 
unforeseen event. 
But what of those who do not deserve their homeless status? What if 
they undeservedly lost their job, were robbed of their possessions, or were the 
descendents of other homeless people? Just like the victims of, say, Hurricane 
Katrina, they do not deserve to be homeless. I assume that there are a large 
number of people in this predicament. If this is the case, it seems there should 
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not be a greater sense of urgency to help those made homeless by Katrina 
than to help the other undeservedly homeless. This is not a suggestion that 
governments should act slower toward the homeless of such disasters, but 
rather quicker to the other homeless. And maybe the government’s duty for 
both these types of undeserved homelessness is only to make sure, returning 
to Rawls’s suggestion, that these people have an equal opportunity to engage 
in public affairs.55  
Assuming such natural disasters do not seriously affect the 
infrastructure, national security, etc. of a country, it seems a government 
would not need to dedicate any more resources to these homeless than it 
would to other undeservedly homeless. There will probably be more resources 
flowing to the former homeless, but this would be because many of them had 
taken out insurance on their homes and other possessions (they are not only 
undeservedly homeless but are also home-deserving); resources will be flowing 
from their insurance companies as compensation for their loss. But this is not 
the government’s concern, since its concern need only go as far as securing 
equal opportunity for these people to engage in public affairs. As for the other 
undeservedly homeless discussed, it is not clear that we can say what they 
deserve other than this equal opportunity, but we can at least say they do not 
deserve to be homeless.  
Hence a government should treat cases equally which are similar in 
relevant respects. This means that a government, come a natural disaster, 
should spend only enough to secure the equal opportunity of those made 
homeless by it (again, assuming infrastructure, security, etc. are not factors). It 
                                               
55 Or perhaps it would also suggest that all should have an equal opportunity to have 
insurance. This would allow for what Dworkin calls ‘brute’ and ‘option’ luck (see Dworkin, 
293ff). The former is something unavoidable and unforeseen that happens to someone, such 
as an  earthquake; the latter results from a choice of the individual, such as loosing a house in 
a landslide after building it on a precipice. Insurance converts luck so that it all reduces to 
option luck; it would protect one against the foreseeable or unforeseeable. Perhaps the case of 
the homeless suggests that all should have equal opportunity to possess insurance. But 
whether this should be the duty of the government or another institution, I am not sure. 
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should only spend more if it has already secured equal opportunity for the 
other undeservedly homeless. To give more resources to natural-disaster-
caused undeservedly homeless than to the some-other-cause undeservedly 
homeless is unequal, and this inequality is unjust. Thus a government should 
treat such cases of desert equally. Resources should be devoted to both types 
of homeless so that they equally have opportunity to engage in public affairs. 
Only once this is established may a government distribute remaining 
resources to the two types as it deems fit.  
 
 
2.1.4 Enforcement of Laws 
 
Just as a government should treat like cases alike as discussed in the 
previous section, so it should do likewise when it comes to the application 
and enforcement of laws. This should be the case regardless of what the 
content of the laws are; even if they are unjust, they should be applied 
equally. As Rawls writes, ‘In this way those subject to them at least know 
what is demanded and they can try to protect themselves accordingly; 
whereas there is even greater injustice if those already disadvantaged are also 
arbitrarily treated in particular cases when the rules would give them some 
security.’56  
If the government did not enforce its laws equally, then its citizens 
would not know how to act in many situations. Or they could complain that 
they were being treated unfairly if they were arrested for an act when the 
government took no notice when others engaged in that act (It would be 
unfair because, I assume, in a pseudo-original position where the rules of 
society were already made, parties would agree with each other (and Rawls) 
                                               
56 Rawls, 51. 
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that these rules should at least be enforced equally). Suppose two people were 
caught stealing, but only one was chosen to be arrested. The person who was 
arrested could ask if the reason for arrest was because stealing is wrong; if the 
answer is yes, the person could ask why the other was not arrested as well, 
but if the answer is no, the person could then ask what the reason for arrest 
was. The response may end up being that the arrest is for some utilitarian 
purpose which infringes on the rights of some citizens for a greater national 
good (which will be discussed to some extent later).  
But I find that such a stance gives a government too much power; it 
would seem to allow for an absolutist government which does what it wants 
when it wants (or else it would lead to an irrational government which acts 
but does not always have reasons for why it acts, if it did not find something 
like stealing wrong but arrested people for doing it nevertheless). I do not 
think that a government ought to have such absolute power and consequently 
maintain that the scope of equality with which a government should be 
concerned extends to the application of laws. 
 
 
2.2 Foreign Policy 
 
 While the previous discussion has focused on issues which pertain to 
either domestic or at least general policy, what follows specifically concerns 
foreign policy. The scope of equality becomes particularly relevant in this 
discussion; while it may be somewhat easy for people to concede that equality 
plays a part in the domestic policy which affects them, it is another thing to 
consider the scope of equality as it pertains to foreign affairs. But it will 
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become clear that it is still quite important in many respects for a government 
to concern itself with equality even in foreign affairs. 
I assume in this discussion that people should be viewed as members 
of the global community. To deny this is to fail to realize how interconnected 
and interdependent the world is. As Charles Beitz writes, ‘For most states, it is 
costly, if possible at all, to withdraw from this structure.‘57 Even regarding 
those for whom it is possible to withdraw from this structure, considerations 
of the world’s limited resources and obligations to others as fellow human 
beings will draw them back. People are inhabitants not just of their countries 
but also of the global community. 
 
 
2.2.1 Guns, Germs and Steel: Equal Opportunity 
 
In his seminal work, Guns, Germs and Steel, Jared Diamond elaborates 
on the initial, pre-civilization state of the modern world—this state seems 
analogous to birth, where congenital traits are apparent. There are numerous 
factors which gave certain communities an advantage over others. For 
example, some parts of the world were conducive to farming, thereby 
allowing communities to move away from hunter-gathering. This meant 
communities could store surplus food, enabling them to dedicate efforts 
elsewhere—to art, invention, technology, etc. which allowed such societies to 
progress much more rapidly than hunter-gatherers. Or in other cases, 
communities in certain parts of the world (for example, Eurasia) were able to 
domesticate large animals, which were a boon for work (e.g., tilling), food 
(milk, beef, mutton, etc.), and fertilization (manure). Other parts of the world 
lacked such animals (like Australia) or such animals were not domesticable 
                                               
57 Charles Beitz, ‘Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,’ International Affairs 75 (1999): 518. 
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(such as in Africa). Yet another factor, on an even larger scale, is the 
geography of the continents: possessing a long east-west axis, Eurasia was 
able to spread food production quicker than those such as the Americas, with 
a long north-south axis but lacking a long east-west one. Food production 
would travel faster along an east-west axis because there would not be as 
significant climate changes impeding such travel. This geographical factor 
had an enormous impact on where civilized centers would arise, and where 
others would remain stagnant or disappear.58 
The point is that such factors are similar to congenital talents; not only 
does this concept apply to individuals but also to nations, as Beitz notes 
Rawls fails to recognize.59 Thus such international redistribution may require 
a significant amount of resources to be invested in a certain nation to achieve 
the given end, but in other nations less may be required to achieve the same 
result. In other words, the distribution should be proportional to need. The 
important consideration to realize is that this need may not result from, and is 
often not due to, misgoverning or mismanagement. Rather, the distribution of 
land, natural resources, animals, etc. will be inevitably unequal initially and 
should be taken into consideration (indeed, Dworkin realizes this at the outset 
of his desert island example). 
It is also important to realize from this, that we are members of a global 
community; resources are limited and significantly affect well-being. Just as 
there is a certain fraternity amongst members of a nation (see section 1.4), so 
there is also fraternity (albeit perhaps to a lesser degree) between people 
globally as users of the world’s limited resources. But to what extent should a 
nation help another in seeking to achieve equality, whether that other nation 
was not naturally endowed the same as others or is lacking in some other 
                                               
58 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: Norton, 
1997). See especially chapters five (pp. 93-103),  nine (pp. 157-175), and ten (pp. 176-191). 
59 Charles Beitz, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples,’ Ethics 110 (2000): 686. 
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respect? This will be the subject of the subsequent discussions on human 
rights and just institutions. 
 
 
2.2.2 Human Rights 
 
This section requires some assumptions that are different from those 
discussed before. I will assume that people should care about (universal) 
human rights. While to many it may seem obvious that people should 
consider human rights, further deliberation may make things less clear. What 
does it mean to claim that there are human rights? Does it mean that every 
person in the world possesses certain rights which cannot be violated except in 
rare, extenuating cases? Or that they have rights which are inviolable and 
inalienable in all circumstances? 
This is an issue which continues to be highly controversial. Some argue 
that enforcing human rights would amount to little more than cultural 
imperialism.60 After all, who decides what are and what are not human 
rights? They are often criticized as being a Western construct. Indeed, the 
person mainly responsible for drafting the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948 was Eleanor Roosevelt, in the US’s post-World War II victory. For 
example, this summer witnessed the execution of the former head of China’s 
Food and Drug Administration, accused of corruption. This act and others 
like it are often condemned by most of the Western world, even though 
governments such as the Chinese sanction such things and presumably do not 
                                               
60 Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice 
(Camberwell: Penguin, 2002), 33. For more on human rights and the paradox of international 
law, see especially chapters two and three (pp. 37-130).  
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consider them to be atrocities nor violations of inalienable rights.61 Why 
would a nation such as this agree to universal human rights? They would be 
viewed by such nations as little more than what Rousseau notes is 
‘ridiculous’—‘an external and private will…subject to error.’62 Can anyone 
really say that there are certain human rights which are to be held 
universally? 
It is not clear that concepts such as Rawls’s original position or veil of 
ignorance would bring much clarity to the debate. Thomas Pogge points out 
that, although Rawls thinks there would be a global consensus on some 
universal human rights, he gives no reason, philosophical or historical, that 
this would be the case.63 Suppose we were to use the contractarian scheme of 
the original position. Since we are trying to frame global principles of justice 
(i.e., universal human rights), the parties should be representative of the 
global population. I am not convinced they would ever come to consensus on 
a list of universal human rights which should be enforced and protected. 
Some, such as many Eastern nations, may have largely utilitarian and 
communitarian mindsets. Thus they may find trampling of human rights 
justifiable if it is for the betterment of the country, in which case such rights 
cease to be categorical and universal. Contrarily, others, such as many 
Western countries, may be advocates of liberalism, where individuals possess 
rights which cannot be denied them for any reason. It should be noted, 
concerning the international original position, that this is not how Rawls 
applies it. He only allows members of what he calls ‘decent and just societies’ 
to be the parties involved—in other words, societies which have already made 
                                               
61 Of course, the US government—one of the only Western countries with the death penalty in 
use—is held accountable to the same critique, a matter which does not escape the eye of most 
human rights organizations. 
62 Jean Jacques Rousseau (1791), The Social Contract, trans. and ed. Charles Frankel (New York: 
Hafner, 1966), 29. 
63 Thomas Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994): 214-
215. 
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a commitment to human rights. Not only does this seem suspect, Beitz also 
points out that this cannot establish the universality that these human rights 
are supposed to possess.64 
In spite of the controversy over universal human rights, I assume that a 
government ought to be concerned with them (for a suggestion of what they 
are, see Appendix B). There are a number of arguments for them which I find 
quite compelling (though, I admit, not conclusive). Moreover, I wonder if 
governments which tread upon such rights do so in full belief that what they 
are doing is in violation of rights they believe are universal.  
In a democratically elected government, people should desire that their 
government protects human rights equally in their nation and abroad. 
Otherwise, who would have reason to come to their aid, should their own 
government begin to impede on their rights? Even though it does not resolve 
the controversy of universal human rights, the original position still proves 
useful. As already stipulated, the parties behind the veil of ignorance know no 
particulars other than that they will be subject to the principles of justice 
which they frame. Assuming that they value their own rights (for example, 
their right to life or to integrity of body), these deliberators will want to frame 
principles such that they will know their rights are guaranteed, in whatever 
society they may find themselves (this, however, does not take into account 
people who do not accept liberalism for themselves, as may be the case of 
people with the more Eastern, communitarian mindset mentioned earlier).  
Rawls has a different reason for protecting them, namely because he 
believes states which violate human rights are aggressive and dangerous and 
are a threat to international stability.65 I do not know if this is necessarily true, 
however; the daily news is teeming with stories of nations violating human 
rights, yet there is not usually a correlative international instability ensuing 
                                               
64 Beitz, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples,’ 686. 
65 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 81.  
Equality and Government Policy 48 
  
because of these violations, nor are many of such nations viewed as 
dangerous. Rather, I think violations of these rights merit attention not 
because of their international effects, but because they are wrong in 
themselves. 
Rawls critiques that advocating such a universal consensus ‘amounts 
to saying that all persons are to have the equal liberal rights of citizens in a 
constitutional democracy...But this foreign policy simply assumes that only a 
liberal democratic society can be acceptable.’66 I am unsure if he is correct in 
this critique. The only presupposition I understood from the original position 
is that the concept of justice would be contractarian, as formulated in a 
hypothetical original position. This seems to me to still be harmonious with, 
say, a communistic or monarchical society; I do not find that it assumes only a 
liberal democratic society is acceptable. Could not a monarchical society have 
such contract-created principles of justice which are enforced by the monarch? 
 Hence I conclude that a government should advocate enforcement and 
protection of human rights equally both at home and abroad. Doing so seems 
just, as it is what most would probably agree to in the original position. The 
lack of global consensus of their delineation need not be an obstacle to coming 
to this conclusion. 
 
 
2.2.3 Just Institutions 
 
Rawls argues that a nation needs to concern itself with others only as 
far as guaranteeing those nations have just institutions.67 Once this is 
achieved, the nation does not have more obligations to assist those other 
                                               
66 Ibid., 82. 
67 To understand better the contours of the concept which he chooses to dub ‘just institutions,’ 
see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47-52.  
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nations. And the amount invested into different nations for just institutions is 
proportional to the need, so different nations may receive resources unequal 
to those distributed to others to achieve this end. Rawls writes that ‘great 
wealth is not necessary to establish just (or decent) nations. How much is 
needed will depend on a society’s particular history as well as on its 
conception of justice. Thus the levels of wealth among the well-ordered 
peoples will not, in general, be the same.’68 Hence a just government’s foreign 
policy might condone large amounts of inequality; such inequality is of little 
concern if nations possess just institutions. 
But one may ask: why are just institutions significant? By helping a 
burdened society, Rawls notes, the goal of a government should be to make it 
so the burdened society can handle its own affairs eventually.69 It is better to 
invest in other nations so that the investment is actually adjusting the 
infrastructure, rather than simply superficially rectifying problems, only for 
them to resurface later. Beyond this, there is little duty for assistance to 
address inequality in such societies, between, say, the rich and poor, or 
inequality between that society and others in the world. But Rawls does note 
that it is important to help ensure equal opportunity for influencing and 
obtaining positions in these institutions.70 That there is great inequality 
between, say, the US and India is not bad, so long as both possess just 
institutions in which people can take part. Non-instrumental egalitarians 
(whose position we have rejected), however, would say this unequal situation 
is bad in a respect. 
There are two things which are important to notice about Rawls’s view. 
First, achieving just institutions does not require that a society be a liberal 
democratic society, as mentioned earlier. Hence a government need not 
                                               
68 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 106. 
69 Ibid., 111. 
70 Ibid., 114. 
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secure liberal democracy to achieve just institutions in other nations, as these 
institutions may exist in numerous governmental frameworks. Secondly, 
Rawls distinguishes his view from cosmopolitanism. On the cosmopolitan 
view, the ultimate units of concern are human beings, and not institutions, 
states, etc. as Rawls seems to maintain.71 Moreover, cosmopolitanism also 
advocates universality and generality—that the issues being discussed apply 
to all, globally, equally, and without discrimination.72 I find cosmopolitanism 
more attractive than Rawls’s view; just institutions only seem to possess value 
insofar as they benefit individuals. A desire for just institutions should spring 
from a cosmopolitan mindset which has individual human beings as its 
objects of interest rather than institutions.   
In his rejection of cosmopolitanism and focus on just institutions, 
Rawls seems to treat just institutions like the sufficientist views of Crisp and 
Frankfurt (see pp. 18-20), thinking that we should focus on those who are not 
sufficiently well off, namely those without just institutions. In doing this he 
seems to maintain that just institutions are a sufficient condition for a society 
to prosper, or at least pursue its concepts of justice and the good. But I do not 
think this is the case. Allan Buchanan writes that ‘being well-governed does 
not ensure that a society will be able to provide a decent and worthwhile life 
for all members nor that its distinctive conception of justice or the good can be 
adequately implemented. A well-governed society might be seriously 
disadvantaged by the global basic structure.’73 For example, a remote island 
may be well-governed yet nevertheless lack resources to provide enough for 
its citizens or to implement its conception of justice, or it may have a 
population too small to gain much influence in the global society and cannot 
pursue its conception of justice. I do agree with Rawls that a government 
                                               
71 Beitz, ‘Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,’ 515.  
72 Thomas Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,’ Ethics 103 (1992): 48. 
73 Allan Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World,’ Ethics 
110 (2000): 705. 
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ought to be concerned with securing just institutions in other nations, but I 
disagree with his conclusion that doing so is sufficient. 
Not only may just institutions often be insufficient, it is also important 
to consider factors outside the nation itself. It is not true that the only matter 
relevant to a nation or peoples’ prosperity is the basic structure of their 
society, as he maintains.74 Multilateral trade sanctions such as those placed on 
North Korea or Iran, for example, would be pointless and irrelevant if this 
were true; in reality a peoples’ prosperity is often dependent upon factors 
outside its society’s structure.  
Or consider the coastal and small-island inhabitants near the Indus 
River, around the oceanic border of Pakistan and India. In the past few years, 
rising water levels have forced numerous inhabitants to leave their homes, 
their economic livelihoods, their lives—research has been suggesting these 
levels have primarily resulted from the effect of CO2 emissions on the climate. 
In other words, such a catastrophe is primarily resultant from the choices of 
well-off, carbon dioxide-emitting nations, not from these inhabitants who reap 
the effects. The basic structure of their society is only one of many factors 
which are pertinent to a peoples’ prosperity. In an idealized world or in the 
distant past, perhaps Rawls’s theory would be correct, but not in the 
contemporary global society. 
                                               
74 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 108. 




Concerning what I have discussed about governments and equality, it 
was necessary to formulate a proper view of justice. Rawls’s contractarian 
position seems persuasive and his original position and veil of ignorance 
prove to be quite illuminating. For a government to be just, it is also necessary 
that it offers equality of opportunity to influence the affairs of society. And 
when discussing equality in general, a government should adopt a 
prioritarian/instrumental egalitarian stance—this is to be preferred over a 
non-instrumental egalitarian position. Equality in itself should not be seen as 
valuable, but rather as a means to an end, as an examination of sufficientism 
has demonstrated. 
The scope of this equality is far reaching and complex. It extends across 
time: it is important to consider equality between the present and future 
generations, but since none can be affected in the past, past generations 
should not be a concern. A government ought to give priority to equality in its 
own country, but at the same time, the scope of equality extends to other 
countries as well. Hence a government must also consider them, making sure 
that its efforts to equalize do not create inequality in others unless it benefits 
the worse off country or if the equality is not significant. 
On the other hand, the scope of equality still does extend globally. For 
example, a government still ought to make sure that all nations are equal in 
the sense that they all have just institutions. Moreover, human rights should 
also be enforced and protected equally both for a government’s citizens and 
others; the original position suggests that this is just. And it is also important 
to remember that the distribution of natural resources results in an unequal 
starting point, much like congenital talents and handicaps in individuals. 
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In its general policy, the scope of equality extends to how a 
government treats cases. Not treating similar cases of desert equally such as 
homelessness results in unfair treatment that irrationally gives preference to 
some over others. Not treating similar applications of the law equally means 
that citizens will not know what is expected of them. However, Nozick’s ideas 
suggest that the scope of equality should not extend to the consequences of 
the free market; it is not unjust if a great amount of inequality results, since 




The ideas I have set forth by no means cover this topic 
comprehensively. I have not discussed whether the scope of equality extends 
to animals, for example. I also am aware that they are still to a large extent 
idealized. I fully realize that it would not be easy to implement many of the 
changes that they would suggest, and if it were, it would take a considerable 
amount of time. Nevertheless, they can still serve to gradually shape present 
government policies. They can serve as a guide when deciding, for example, 
between candidates for a public office by helping to clarify which people give 
significant weight to equality in the policies they claim to advocate. Moreover, 
I find that many of the topics discussed are quite useful and should shape 
peoples’ thoughts for everyday interactions and discussions with others. 
 




It does not seem to be particularly obvious that one savings rate is 
better across the board than another. There may be arguments for and against 
certain rates in economics; myself lacking much economical training, I am 
unsure of what these may be. Regardless, through doing a bit of math 
examining a couple of hypothetical situations, I concluded that an equal 
distribution need not be preferable.  
Using p as the rate of savings and a as the resources of a given society, 
we can construct a formula to represent the savings rate, where f(x) represents 
the total level of resources a generation has after it inherits what the previous 
generation has saved for it and after it has saved for the next generation: 
 
f(x) = pa + (1 - p)(f(x - 1)) 
 
Or non-recursively,  
 
f(x) = a(1 - (1 - p)x ) 
 
We can plug in 0.5 for p and compare its graph with the graph of inserting 0.9 
for p. The first of these would represent an equal savings rate, where the 
present generation conserves for future generations the same amount which it 
spends for itself. The second is a much lower savings rate, where the present 
generation saves only 10% for future generations and spends the rest is spent 
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On the first of the two options (the equal savings rate), the generation starts at 
0.5a since it saves half its resources for the next generation. Its graph is 
asymptotic to a. Similarly, the lower savings rate starts at the higher level of 
0.9a, but also has a as its asymptote. Hence we can see that while the graphs 
show that resource levels would be different for a while, after a number of 
generations, an equal distribution has no different consequences than an 
unequal one.  
 For example, if a society has resources of level 100 and x is measured in 
terms of generations who adopt the savings rate, then when x = 1, saving 90% 
of a generation’s resources will give them a level of 90. When x = 2—i.e., the 
second generation from when the saving began—that generation receives the 
10% saved from the previous generation, so it would have 110, but it also 
saves 10% for the next generation and thus has an adjusted level of 99. In the 
third generation, the level would be 99.9. On the equal savings rate, the first 
generation would be significantly lower—at a level of 50, since it saves 50% 
for the next generation. The second generation’s level with its inheritance but 
minus its savings would be 75. The third, 83.5. In both cases, each is 
asymptotic to 100—the initial value of the resource-level a. By the end of 
about six generations, the values level off at approximately 100. In other 
words, after this many generations, it matters little which savings rate was 
chosen as their resource level remains the same regardless. 
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 A non-instrumental egalitarian may prefer the equal option since such 
equality would be valuable in itself, even though it does not make a 
significant difference. Since I am, however, not a non-instrumental egalitarian, 
I do not find the equal option especially valuable for this reason. In fact, it 
may be the case that people would prefer the lower savings rate; since they 
would be behind the veil of ignorance, they would want to account for the 
possibility that they may find themselves in one of the earlier generations 
where the savings rate actually matters. The deliberators would probably 
want to minimize this risk and would consequently prefer a lower savings 
rate. But what this level would be is unclear—for example, they may want to 
save for their descendents in the proximate generation and would tend to a 
more equal savings rate, or they may prefer to keep more for themselves.  
Hence I do not find it necessary to argue for a specific savings rate, or that the 
scope of equality need extend to it.  




Since the previous discussion has been committed to equality and 
government responsibility, insufficient space does not allow for much of a 
discussion of human rights. In addition, such a discussion would lead into a 
number of issues which are beyond the scope of my argument. Below, 
however, are two examples of suggestions for basic universal rights.  
Rawls writes in The Law of Peoples that the basic rights all peoples 
around the world should hold include (he admits the list is incomplete): 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war 
for reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct 
of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political regime.75 
 
He defines the ‘human rights’ people are to honor: 
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Among the human rights are the right to life (to the means of 
subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, 
and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of 
conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property 
(personal property); and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of 
natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly). Human 
rights, as thus understood, cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or 
special to the Western tradition. They are not politically parochial.76 
  
These rights above are also what he terms ‘equal basic liberties’ in his two 
principles of justice.77 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights defends a 
more comprehensive set of rights (much abridged here): 
 
 Article 1: All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
Article 2: Everyone is entitled to these rights without distinction. 
Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person. 
Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
Article 5: No one shall be subject to torture or cruel punishment. 
Article 6: Everyone has right to recognition before the law. 
Article 7: All are guaranteed equal protection of the law. 
Article 8: Everyone has a right to remedy for violations of their rights. 
Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or 
exile. 
Article 10: All are entitled to an independent and impartial tribunal. 
Article 11: Everyone is innocent until proven guilty. 
Article 12: No one shall be subject to arbitrary invasion of privacy. 
Article 13: Everyone has a right to freedom of movement. 
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Article 14: All have a right to asylum from persecution. 
Article 15: All have a right no a nationality. 
Article 16: Marriage shall only be entered into by free consent of the 
parties. 
Article 17: All have the right to property. 
Article 18: Everyone has a right to freedom of thought and religion. 
Article 19: All have a right to freedom of opinion through media. 
Article 20: Everyone may peacefully assemble and associate. 
Article 21: All have the right to take part in their country’s government. 
Article 22: All have a right to social security. 
Article 23: Everyone has the right to work. 
Article 24: Everyone has the right to rest and relaxation from work. 
Article 25: All have a right to adequate well-being for their families. 
Article 26: All are entitled to an education. 
Article 27: Everyone has a right to participate in their society’s culture. 
Article 28: Everyone is entitled to an international order which realizes 
these rights. 
Article 29: The given rights cannot be exercised in a spirit contrary to 
the principles of the United Nations. 
Article 30: None of these rights can be used in support of the 
destruction of the rights of others.78 
 
Hence one may see that the rights suggested by Rawls and Eleanor Roosevelt 
(and the United Nations), respectively, might be contentious. All will likely 
not agree to these formulations; consequently, it is often difficult to be able to 
label them ‘universal.’  
 
                                               
78 Robertson, 575-582. 
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